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Abstract 
The effectiveness of the management team, ownership structure and other corporate 
governance systems in determining appropriate risk taking is a critical issue in a modern 
commercial bank. Appropriate risk management techniques and structures within 
financial institutions play an important role to ensure the stability of economy. After 
analyzing 43 Asian banks over the period from 2006 to 2014, I find that banks with 
strong corporate governance are associated with higher risk taking. More specifically, 
banks with intermediate size of board, separation of CEO and chairman of board, and 
audited by Big Four audit firm, are likely higher risk taking. Overall, my findings 
provide some new perspectives into the governance mechanisms that affect risk taking 
on commercial banks. 
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1 Introduction 
The reason of 2008 financial crisis is to a large extent attributable to excessive risk-
taking by financial institution (DeYoung et al., 2013; Minton et al., 2014). In turn, 
international supervisory authorities propose an array of requirements to monitor and 
control bank risk. Besides, the forces of technological change contributed to the 
progressive process of financial integration and increased competition in the banking 
industry over the last two decades. Therefore, the scope of banks’ operations and 
activities has been completely reshaped, from traditional intermediation products to an 
array of new businesses. As a result of this process, the intensive competition may lead 
to greater risk-taking of bank, or possibly excessive risk.  
 
Given that corporate governance is essentially a mechanism for controlling risk within 
the bank, it is not surprising that the recent academic studies have emphasized the 
importance of effective corporate governance practices in the banking industry 
(Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2015). Some researches argue 
that banks with better governance have lower risk taking (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; 
De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Yet, other studies claim that banks with more favorite 
shareholders governance associate with higher risk taking (Erkens et al., 2012; Wang 
and Hsu, 2013). Moreover, the same governance may have different effects on bank 
risk taking depending on the bank’s ownership structure (Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Adams and Mehran, 2012), and board composition (Pathan, 2009). These mixed 
empirical evidences motivate my investigation. 
 
I empirically investigate the relationship between bank risk taking and corporate 
governance using data from listed commercial banks on Great China banking industry 
in 2006 to 2014 period. My results show that banks with strong corporate governance 
are associated with higher risk taking. More specifically, banks with no relationship 
among top 10 shareholders, a meaningful stake holding by managers and audited by 
Big Four audit firm, are likely taking more risk. These findings are consistent with the 
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importance of the monitoring role of bank governance in recent papers (Anginer et al., 
2016; Bolton et al., 2015). 
 
My chapter complements the existing empirical research on banking governance in 
several ways. First, my underlying idea is that several characteristics of the corporate 
governance might reflect shareholders’ motivation to effectively monitor and advise 
managers. Bank governance research on risk taking typically incorporates the 
information on board compositions alone, such as the board size, the number of board 
meetings and the percentage of independent board members. However, ownership 
structure is an essential part of governance, which should be also a significant factor in 
explaining risk difference for banking sector (Barry, et al., 2011). My research aims to 
fill this gap by incorporate three characteristics to construct a governance score, which 
represents the level of corporate governance. In addition, measurement of bank risk can 
encompass a variety of dimensions; my chapter focus on loan quality and default risk 
(Z score). 
 
Second, my chapter increases the understanding of banking governance in an emerging 
economy by involving China’s banking sector. This sector is dominated by large state-
owned banks that operate under strict government regulations and intervention. 
Intensive government intervention may reduce the role of corporate governance on 
effectively monitoring managers. However, my results show that the internal 
governance is still an effective mechanism to monitor bank risk taking in Chinese 
market, which consistent with the finding on European and US markets.  
 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
related literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 outlines the methodology used 
in this chapter to construct measures of corporate governance and bank risk taking, as 
well as describes the empirical model used. Section 4 describes my dataset, including 
descriptive statistics about governance mechanisms and bank risk taking. In section 5 I 
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discuss my main empirical results on the relation between governance and bank risk 
taking. Section 6 presents results from additional robustness checks. Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Banking research has devoted tremendous effort to studying the roles of corporate 
governance in recent years. Some studies emphasize that flaws in corporate governance 
play a key role in bank risk taking (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2015; Williams, 2014; 
Minton et al., 2014). Srivastav and Hagendorff (2015) highlight the need for effective 
bank governance to mitigate the behavior, harming the interest of different stakeholders 
and exacerbating risk taking, which reflect the needs of shareholders, creditors and the 
taxpayer. The idea is generally that strong corporate governance normally associates 
with better risk management function, which would lead to correctly identify risks and 
prevent such excessive risk taking. Therefore, my chapter is related to two strands of 
literature: first, to the extensive literature on corporate governance in the banking sector; 
and second, to the literature on the effects of bank risk taking. 
 
Corporate governance is significantly related to bank risk taking because there are some 
observed and unobserved bank characteristics. Such bank characteristics include the 
functioning of the board, CEO duality, ownership structure, and external monitoring. 
Follow Srivastav and Hagendorff (2015), I define bank risk-taking as policies that 
increase risk through governance channels.  
 
Academics have argued that the board is shareholders’ first line of defense in 
governance (Adams and Mehran, 2012; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Indeed, the 
role of the board of directors in overseeing and identifying risk in financial institutions 
has come under scrutiny after financial crisis. Besides, establishing and implementing 
risk control systems are also part of the responsibility of boards. Thus, the boards 
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become one of key mechanisms to monitor managements’ behavior on risk taking of 
the firm. Furthermore, having strong board governance structure is important to ensure 
that bank managers focuse on the right issues. However, the evidence for a beneficial 
effect of boards’ composition on bank risk taking has remained far from convincing. 
Specifically, extant literatures on boards of directors concentrate on the determinants of 
the size, board meeting and the fraction of independent board members are still mixed 
and inconsistent. 
 
The relationship between board size and bank risk taking remains ambiguous. Large 
boards may add value due to the operational, geographic and financial complexity in 
banking firms, which need a greater level of advising and monitoring, as well as less 
easily captured by management. Adams and Mehran (2012) find that board size is 
positively related to performance. However, free-rider problems may arise in large 
boards which negatively affect the value of a bank. According to Jensen (1993), 
increased group becomes less effective because the coordination and process problems. 
Anginer et al. (2016) find that the form of boards of intermediate size is associated with 
lower bank risk taking in terms of bank capitalization. Equally, De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) also suggest that an inverted U-shaped relation between board size and bank 
performance. Pathan (2009) finds that a small bank board is associated with more bank 
risk taking. 
 
The presence of independent directors on bank board is mainly to mitigate the agency 
cost of equity. More independent directors in a board are expected to better represent 
the interest of shareholders and effectively monitor a bank’s managers. However, the 
impact of more or less independent board on bank risk-taking is unclear given the mixed 
nature of the empirical results. For instance, De Andres and Vallelado (2008) find that 
larger and not excessively independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring 
and advising functions, and create more value. Erkens et al. (2012) find that banks with 
more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a 
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wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Nevertheless, both Anginer 
et al. (2016) and Pathan (2009) report a higher fraction of independent directors pursue 
less risky policies. Minton et al. (2014) find that independent directors with financial 
expertise support increased risk taking prior to the financial crisis on US banks.  
 
CEO power is also an important factor to affect board’s monitoring ability. CEO duality 
restricts the information flow to other members of the board, which may give rise to 
riskier bank strategies, and hence negatively affects the independence of board. 
DeYoung et al. (2013) show that contractual risk taking incentives for CEO increased 
when industry deregulation expanded banks’ growth opportunities. Thus effective 
separation of the CEO and chairman roles may enable a board to promote the interests 
of shareholders better (Anginer et al., 2016).  
 
Despite with standard factors on board governance discussed above, Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015) examine the association between ‘‘busyness” of the board of directors 
(serving on multiple boards) and bank holding company (BHC) risk. Berger et al. (2014) 
demonstrate that banks take on more portfolio risk if they are managed by younger 
executives and as higher proportion of female executives, while board changes increase 
executives holding PhD degree would reduce portfolio risk.  
 
In addition to the board function, standard agency theories suggest that ownership 
structure has impact on corporate risk taking. Indeed, analysis without ownership 
structure may provide an incomplete evidence of bank risk taking. Laeven and Levine 
(2009) find that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance 
policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends on each bank’s ownership structure. 
However, the evidence on the relationship between the ownership of banks and bank 
risk-taking is still mixed. Lin and Zhang (2009) assess the effect of bank ownership on 
performance in Chinese market, they find that banks with foreign ownership are more 
profitable and have better asset quality than state-owned banks. As management of 
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state-owned bank is not adequately monitored, and there is no private owner with 
necessary incentives to engage in active monitoring. Iannotta et al. (2013) use cross-
country data on a sample of large European banks and find that government-owned 
banks have lower default risk but higher operating risk than private banks, indicating 
the presence of governmental protection induces higher risk taking. In addition, 
institutional ownership of common share of bank has increased substantially over the 
past two decades, which also implies changes in corporate governance and banks’ 
behavior in terms of risk taking. Both Erkens et al. (2012) and Barry et al. (2011) claim 
that banks with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which 
resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period. Moreover, Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004) show that the relationship between the stable shareholders ownership 
and bank risk is nonlinear after examining empirically the determinants of risk taking 
at Japanese commercial banks.  
 
Hypothesis development 
H1: Strong corporate governance associated with lower bank risk taking.  
My main hypothesis is motivated by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), which suggest that 
banks with strong internal control on governance should have lower tail risk, all else 
equal. In opposite prospective, the poor governance banks likely engaged in excessive 
risk taking, causing them to make larger losses. First, for risks to be successfully 
managed, they must first be identified and measured correctly. A strong risk 
management function is necessary to correctly identify risks and prevent such excessive 
risk-taking. The main job of effective risk management at banks is to limit exposure to 
risk, and hence to the possibility of negative outcomes (Chernobai et al., 2012). 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) suggest that risk management is central to banks’ operating 
policies. Keys et al. (2009) find that strong risk management is associated with less 
risky subprime loan securitizations. Because only safe debt commands a liquidity 
premium, banks use risk management to maximize their capacity to include such debt 
into their operation. In addition, Minton et al. (2014), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and 
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Aebi et al. (2012) all show that risk management governance can affect bank risk taking. 
There are many tools used by bank to control their portfolio risk and maintain higher 
level of safe debt, such as diversification, hedging, using derivatives. Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) suggest that banks with better governance (lower G-Index), more 
independent boards, and less entrenched CEOs have strong risk management function 
in large US bank holding companies. Moreover, Aebi et al. (2012) document that banks 
with its chief risk officer (CRO) directly reporting to the board of directors exhibit 
significantly higher stock returns and return on equity during financial crisis in 2008. 
Besides, from an asset quality management, better quality credit and reducing excessive 
share of illiquid loans in asset portfolio will diminish bank risk-taking (Ghosh, 2015).  
 
Second, the risk taking are affected not just by risk management, but also by the taking 
of private benefits of larger shareholders. Larger shareholder may opt to risk averse 
investment in order to protect their private benefit. Because there is less fear of 
expropriation by insiders if the corporate governance improves (Burkart et al., 2003), 
the dominant shareholders might reduce their holding or direct influencing the decision 
making by managers. As from a shareholder’s perspective, assessing the risk of a bank 
may be more difficult than other nonfinancial firms. Thereafter, managers would 
implement conservative investment policies, which lead to reduce risk taking.  
 
The third argument is the managerial incentives matter. Higher executive compensation 
lead to excessive risk-taking by banks (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; DeYound et al., 2013; 
Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009; Bolton et al., 2015), which may improve performance in 
the short run, but it also can cause significant impairment to the bank when such risk 
materialize. Specifically, equity-based compensation (EBC) has increased recently for 
embedded in bank executive compensation packages. The advantage of EBC for 
executive is to share the benefits from risky investment with shareholders and reduce 
agency cost. As senior managers’ personal wealth is undiversified, they would not 
support the positive net present value but risky investment, which may lead to risk 
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aversion. Indeed, it is difficult to directly monitor managers when firms have wide 
range of investment opportunity sets. However, adopting EBC schemes align the 
interest of management and shareholders, and also encourage managers to pass up risky 
investment. A number of studies on financial firms provide evidence consistent with 
this phenomenon. Specifically, Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) find the evidence 
which support for the view that increased EBC leads banks to make riskier choices in 
their mergers and acquisition decisions. As Core et al. (1999) note, the executives earn 
greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. Overall, the 
presence of strong corporate governance may be necessary to control risk exposures of 
financial institutions. 
 
H2: Strong corporate governance associated with higher bank risk taking. 
My second hypothesis is that banks with strong corporate governance attributes may 
take more risk. Value-maximizing shareholders are likely to choose aggressive 
strategies, especially for banks, and such risky strategies may lead to significant loss. 
Thus, firm with better investor protection governance are likely to undertake riskier but 
value enhancing investments (John et al., 2008). Anginer et al. (2016) find that 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance associate with lower bank capitalization, 
such relationship is especially strong for banks located in developed countries. Besides, 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with 
the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed 
better. Pathan (2009) finds that strong banks’ board positively affect bank risk taking. 
Sullivan and Spong (2007) also find that stock ownership by hired managers can 
increase total risk of a bank.  
 
In addition, deposit insurance scheme is widely applied in many countries as part of a 
financial system safety net to promote banking stability. However, the scheme may 
contribute to bank shareholders moral hazard problem by stimulating higher bank risk 
taking as they enjoy a ‘subsidy’ which increases in value of leverage. For instance, 
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Laeven and Levine (2009) find that that deposit insurance is associated with an increase 
in risk when the bank has a large equity holder with sufficient power to act on the 
additional risk-taking incentives created by deposit insurance. The scheme also 
discourages most bank creditors from limiting managers’ risk taking. Anginer et al., 
(2014) find that deposit insurance scheme increases bank risk and systemic fragility in 
the years leading up to the global financial crisis. Since shareholders have incentives to 
take higher risk, thus strong corporate governance can be expected to associate with 
bank risk taking positively.  
 
H3: Corporate governance has no impact on bank risk taking. 
My third hypothesis is that the corporate governance does not have any impact on bank 
risk taking. Several arguments support this hypothesis. First, because risk managers of 
bank are without any real power, it is merely to satisfy regulatory requirement to appoint 
them by bank. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find no relationship between better governance 
and bank risk taking because the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital 
market funding. Vazquez and Federico (2015) also find that banks with weaker 
structural liquidity and higher leverage were more likely to fail afterward.  
 
Second argument relates to regulatory. Stability of the banking sector is a major concern 
of relevant economic authorities. Indeed, the authorities use several tools to monitor 
and control bank risk taking, which includes capital requirements, restrictions on bank 
activities and official supervisory power. As the failure of banking sector would 
increase systemic risk and cause possible consequent meltdown of whole financial 
system. Fratzscher et al. (2016) suggest that bank supervision/regulation and 
institutions tend to be substitutes rather than complements. There is an obvious example 
showing that many governments’ bail-out to stabilize financial institution in the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. However, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) find that 
government’s bail-outs lead to higher risk taking among the protected bank’s 
competitors. Acharya et al. (2014) documents that bailouts triggered the rise of 
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sovereign credit risk in 2008. Banks’ shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ 
supported by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders 
(Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). Williams (2014) find the evidence of risk seeking 
due to ‘too big to fail’ effects in Asian region.  
 
Third, market discipline is another mechanism in influencing bank risk taking (Bennett 
et al., 2015; Hilscher and Raviv, 2014; Barry et al., 2011), because the market 
participants have the incentives to monitor the bank and the ability to process accurately 
the disclosed information. In addition, The Basel Accord III has highlighted the 
importance of market discipline and it is one of the three pillars in Basel Accord II. 
However, empirical evidence on the market discipline is remaining mixed in banking 
sector. Hilscher and Raviv (2014) conclude that market discipline is an effective tool 
for stabilizing financial institutions after investigating the effects of issuing contingent 
capital. Hou et al. (2016) investigates whether the depositor discipline of banking works 
in the context of an emerging economy under financial repression and implicit 
government guarantee, and they find that bank risk is negatively associated with the 
growth of deposit volumes.  
 
Finally, several studies conclude that the managerial incentive on governance does not 
connect with the risk taking in banking industry. One plausible interpretation is that the 
board provides their executives the incentives necessary to exploit the growth 
opportunities in new products, such as insurance underwriting, securities brokerage, 
and investment banking. But the investment opportunities were limited by regulatory 
restriction in banking industry. Therefore, EBC are expected to be lower under strict 
regulation, leading to weaker incentives to take risk.  
 
H4: Corporate governance has positively impact bank risk taking while bank 
performance increasing. 
H5: Corporate governance has negatively impact bank risk taking while bank 
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performance increasing. 
Banking theory suggests that corporate governance affect the risk taking in different 
economic environment. Better governed bank can identify risks that are more beneficial 
to shareholder and encourage managers to take on higher risks in normal time. Strong 
risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks (Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013). Minton et al. (2014) claim that financial expertise among the boards is associated 
with more risk taking prior to the financial crisis. However, it is commonly believed 
that the better governed banks would have limited the excessive risks taken by banks’ 
management and mitigated their fall during the financial crisis. Poor bank governance 
might be a major cause of financial crisis because banks with more shareholder-friendly 
boards performed worse during the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Thus, it is an 
empirical question as to whether the corporate governance is associated with more or 
less risk taking while bank performance increasing. 
 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Measures of corporate governance 
Following Hass et al. (2014), I construct a parsimonious index to measure the strength 
of bank corporate governance. The index contains three aspects of corporate 
governance, which are the board governance, ownership structure and quality of 
external auditor.  
 
First, bank board should able to effectively monitor and control bank risk (Minton et 
al., 2014; Berger et al., 2014). Therefore, banks with boards that are more effective in 
monitoring and advisory management terms are better governed. A vast of literatures 
discusses the composition of the board of directors. I argue that three crucial aspects on 
boards of directors need to emphasis relating to bank risk taking, which are the fraction 
of independence directors, board size and CEO duality. Adams and Mehran (2012) find 
that banks have larger and more independent boards than other non-financial firms. 
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More independent board members would improves the supervision of management and 
reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. The skilled 
independent directors help to improve the strategic decision and risk management 
control. As a bank grows and diversifies, it faces an increasing demand for specialized 
outsides board members who can perform tasks such as identifying and monitoring risk. 
Liang et al. (2013) find that the proportion of independent directors has positively 
impacts on bank asset quality in Chinese banks. In addition, the advantage of large 
boards is able to assign more people to supervise and advice on managers’ decisions. 
Both Pathan (2009) and Wang and Hsu (2013) find that small boards lead to additional 
bank risk as reflected in market measure of risk. In contrast, large boards may encounter 
problems of coordination, control, and decision-making, as well as the concern of free 
rider. But the small boards may not have enough ability to monitor such complexity of 
the banking business. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) confirm that a hypothesized 
inverted U-shaped relation between board size and bank performance. Furthermore, 
Anginer et al. (2016) show that separation of the CEO and chairman roles associated 
with higher bank risk in terms of bank capitalization due to a board independence from 
management. In contrast, Pathan (2009) find that CEO power (CEO’s ability to control 
board decision) negatively affects bank risk taking. 
 
Apart from the board governance, the incentives of managers or directors to take risk 
should also be considered on banking sector. The managers or directors may have 
incentive to take less risk when they hold a small share of the banks’ ownership. As 
managers’ human capital investment and reputation are non-diversifiable, thus they 
have incentive to lead a bank better performance. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find 
that the banks with managers whose incentives were better aligned with shareholders 
affects performance. However, Saunders et al. (1990) shows that stockholder controlled 
banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled 
banks during deregulation period. In addition, given the growing significance of 
financing across countries, foreign ownership is one of the factors that draw 
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considerable attention from corporate governance. Foreign investors are in the position 
with informational disadvantage compare to domestic investors (Choe et al., 2005). 
Besides, foreign investors avoid invest to poorly governed corporation because they 
suffer from asymmetrical information problems (Leuz et al., 2010; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008). Therefore, they are normally acting more risk adverse. 
 
Large controlling shareholders are suggested by concentrated their stakes to monitor 
managers and directly intervene in investment decisions (Porta et al., 1999), which may 
help to mitigate the agency costs. However, ownership concentration stimulates 
shareholders’ incentives to seek private benefit of control (Faccio et al., 2001; Peng et 
al., 2011), which could negatively affect firms’ corporate governance. The first reason 
is that relational large shareholders have incentive and opportunity to gain access to 
critical information which benefit for them. Second, the relational of shareholders 
provides facility for expropriating benefit from dispensed small shareholders. Thus, the 
presence of the relation between larger shareholders is likely affect firms’ corporate 
governance.  
 
The regulatory environment can constrain the excessive bank risk taking. More 
specifically, a high quality audit is expected to affect firms’ governance. The level of 
monitoring and control imposed by external audits and supervisory actions can improve 
the governance and constrain opportunistic of excessive risk-taking (Bouvatier et al., 
2014).  
 
Based on above discussion and consistent with Hass et al. (2014), I filter seven relevant 
characteristics, which are the percentage of total directors who are independent 
(1INDIV); the number of directors serving on the bank's board (2BS); CEO power is 
whether or not the CEO also chairs the board (3DUAL); whether there are any relational 
of the largest ten shareholders (4TOP10); the percentage of shares owned by directors, 
supervisors, and executives (5MH); the percentage of shares owned by foreign 
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shareholders (6FOREIGN); and who is their external auditor (7AUDIT). Thereafter, in 
light of the findings previous studies (e.g. Bouvatier et al., 2014; Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Anginer et al., 2016; DeYoung et al., 2013), I apply specific criteria for each 
characteristic. According to Hass et al. (2014), a dummy variable is being constructed 
for each characteristic that meets certain criteria. Seven criteria are specifying as 
following: whether the board consist 50% of independent board members; whether the 
board size greater than 6 but less than 13; whether separation of the role of CEO and 
board chairman; whether there is no relation among the top 10 largest shareholders; 
whether there is any holding of executive greater than 1% but less than 30%; whether 
there have any foreign ownership; whether the bank audited by the joint ventures of the 
Big Four1 internal audit firms and domestic audit firms. Finally, I add the seven criteria 
into a total score that represent the overall governance quality, donated as CG. Higher 
score indicates strong corporate governance for individual bank in a particular year.  
 
3.2 Measures of bank risk taking 
A traditional measure of banks’ risk is the standard deviation of either return on equity 
or return on assets. However, this type measure has been criticized imprecision as based 
upon small samples. Two proxies of bank risk are selected to show whether strong 
corporate governance have any impact on the bank risk taking. I primarily measure 
bank risk using the Z-score, which is widely used in the bank literature as a bank risk-
taking indicator (see, for instance, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Fu et al., 2014; Williams, 
2014; Minton et al., 2014; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Z-score calculated as follows: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
 
(Equation 1) 
where ROA is the return on assets, E/TA is the ratio of equity to total assets, and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴 
is the standard deviation of return on assets. As the Z-score is highly skewed, following 
Laeven and Levine (2009) and Fu et al. (2014), I use natural logarithm of the Z-score, 
which is normally distributed.  
                                                             
1 The Big Four audit firms are Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC. 
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The Z-score measures the distance from insolvency because a bank becomes insolvent 
when its assets value less than its debts. As it shows the number of standard deviations 
below the average a bank’s return on assets has to fall in order for that bank’s capital 
reserves to be depleted. So the larger Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable as 
away from bankruptcy. Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) use Z-score as insolvency risk and 
find that banks with a greater number of busy directors exhibit lower insolvency risks. 
and Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that Z-score are positively associated with 
shareholder-friendly boards. Minton et al. (2014) suggest that boards consisting of 
higher amount of financial experts were positively associate with bank risk, which 
measured by Z-score. Fu et al., (2014) investigate the influence of bank competition, 
concentration, regulation and national institutions on individual bank fragility as 
measured the bank’s Z-score.  
 
My second measure of risk is the reserve of impairment loans, which reflects credit 
quality of banks and the overall attitude of the banking system. Bank with poor credit 
quality would associate with the risky loan portfolio, which in turn results in higher 
risk-taking. This risk measure is commonly applied in recent banking study. For 
instance, Haq and Heaney (2012) use loan loss provision as a measure to examine the 
determinants of bank risk.  
 
3.3 Other explanatory variables 
Following Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), Fu et al. (2014), Laeven and Levine (2009) and 
Williams (2014), I include a range of bank specific variables to explain bank risk taking 
and obtain consistence parameters. These measures are common and well accepted in 
recent banking literature.  
 
One of the most debatable questions is whether size affects bank risk taking. Large 
banks are benefit from diversification and economies of scales, which would be more 
stable than smaller banks. Pathan (2009) shows that bank size lower insolvency risk. 
Haq and Heaney (2012) also find that large banks reflect lower credit risk. Besides, 
smaller banks are easier to be liquidated or the target of unfavorable takeovers when 
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they are in financial distress. However, banks are becoming larger and arguably more 
complex, which may increase difficulty to monitor their risk effectively. Fu et al., (2014) 
find that smaller banks tend to be less risky in a recent study of Asian banks. In addition, 
the concept of ‘too big to fail’ is important to the national banking system as the 
government are likely seek to prevent bank failure (Williams, 2014). Given the 
skewness of the size distribution, the logarithm of its total assets (LNTA) is being 
employed as proxy for a bank’s size, which consistent as Fu et al. (2014), Pathan (2009) 
and Laeven and Levine (2009).  
 
Diversification provides a credible signal of bank’s ability to minimize risk. In contrast, 
increased non-interest income also generates agency conflicts and increased complexity. 
Broad activities may lead to the bank extremely large and complex that are 
extraordinarily difficult to monitor and ‘‘too big to discipline’’ (Laeven and Levine, 
2007). In addition, diversification might intensify moral hazard problem and present 
more opportunities for banks to take higher risk. As diversification relates to both bank 
risk taking and corporate governance, I additionally control for the banks’ 
diversification activities. Following Fu et al. (2014), I employed the return on average 
asset (ROAA) to track the profitability of a bank’s operating activities. 
 
Theory suggests an important role for capital in mitigating agency problems and the 
attendant uncertainty for outsider stakeholders, especially depositor in particular on 
banking sector. Bank capital is the main source to act as buffer to against unexpected 
default, but the effect of bank capital on risk is ambiguous. Greater equity capital 
encourages prudent behavior and improves the survival probability of bank (Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012; Fratzscher et al., 2016). Both Fratzscher et al. (2016) and Haq and 
Heaney (2012) find that the higher capital buffer the lower the bank risk, which 
consistent with the argument that facilitate stability the banking system. Besides, Lee 
and Hsieh (2013) also find that a negative relation between capital and bank risk. 
Konishi and Yasuda (2004) find that the implementation of the capital adequacy 
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requirement reduced risk taking at commercial banks. Yet, moral hazard hypothesis 
suggest that banks’ manager have incentive to increase risk taking. Highly capitalized 
bank may take more risk as the deposit being guaranteed. Ghosh (2015) find a positive 
relationship between the level of capital and bank risk. Moreover, Williams (2014) find 
a U-shaped relationship between bank risk and capital. I use the ratio of total equity to 
total asset to measure capitalization, muck like Ghosh (2015) and Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012).  
 
In additional to bank-specific variables, the impact of state-level economic conditions 
on bank risk also needs to take into account (Ghosh, 2015). Banks may fail to 
internalized risks stemming from overheated macroeconomic and loose monetary 
conditions (Vazquez and Federico, 2015). Thus, I include three measures of economic 
performance to control for different macroeconomic conditions. 
 
First, the rate of real GDP growth (RGDP), the most natural indicator of the business 
cycle of an economy, is used as a proxy for the fluctuations in economic activity. Ghosh 
(2015) shows that higher state real GDP reduce nonperforming loans. The GDP growth 
is expected to have a negative effect on bank risk because the demand for revenue 
increases during cyclical upswings. Alternatively, positive relationship is expected if 
the level of bank risk is lower in business upturns given a countercyclical 
materialization. Both Williams (2014) and DeYoung et al. (2013) find that banks in 
better economic environments are more likely to implement risk-increasing investment 
strategies. 
 
Second, inflation rate also has an ambiguous role in determinant on bank risk taking. 
Inflation variability causes lenders to estimate incorrectly the value of loan collateral 
and borrowers’ loan repayment. Thus, stable and constant inflation rate would reduce 
the real value of debt, in turn lower bank risk. However, excessive inflation rate may 
deplete borrowers’ real income and booming bank risk, especially when the income 
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does not raises compare with inflation. Ghosh (2015) find a positive relationship 
between inflation rate and bank risk taking. 
 
Third, lending interest rate is being employed as proxy for the term structure of 
borrowing. Banks normally use short-term deposits to finance long-term lending. 
Rising in interest rate may increases the real value of borrowers’ debt, stimulates debt 
servicing more expensive, as well as increase loan defaults. Thus, bank risk may be 
positively impacted by the lending interest rate. However, Ghosh (2015) show that 
interest rate has no effect on bank risk, in terms of nonperforming loans. 
 
3.4 Empirical models 
Panel data analysis is the most efficient instrument to use when the sample is a mixture 
of time series and cross-sectional data. So the following regression equation is 
formulated to test empirically the hypotheses 1 to 3,  
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (Equation 2) 
 
where t and i denote time period and banks, respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term with a 
mean of zero. RISK refers to the i th bank’s risk-taking in year t, proxied by two risk 
variables: Z-score (ZS) and loan loss provision (LLP). CG is the score of corporate 
governance. In addition, four internal control variables are set as the bank specific 
characteristics: the logarithm of total assets (LNTA), equity to assets ratio (ETA), price 
to earnings ratio (PE), return on average asset (ROAA), and the logarithm of total 
deposit (DEP). Furthermore, three macro control variables are set as the related external 
control variables: GDP growth rate (GDP), inflation rate (INF), and lending interest 
rate (INT).  
 
To test the hypotheses 4 and 5, the interaction term of GG and ROAA is being included 
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in the equation 3, 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝐺 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 3) 
 
The definition of the above bank risk proxies and explanatory variables are summarized 
in Table (1). 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Corporate governance   
Independent members 1NDIV Whether board is controlled by more 
than 50% independent directors 
Manual collection 
Board size 2BS Whether board size is greater than 6 
but fewer than 13 
Manual collection 
CEO chairman duality 3DUAL The chairman and CEO are not the 
same person 
Manual collection 
Relationship  4TOP10 There are no relationships among the 
top ten shareholders 
Manual collection 
Managerial holding 5MH Management ownership (directors, 
supervisors, and executives) is greater 
than 1% but less than 30% 
Manual collection 
Foreign ownership 6FORE Foreign investor ownership is greater 
than zero 
Manual collection 
Bi4 4 Audit firm 7AUDIT Audited by one of the Big 4 audit 
firm or their joint ventures 
Manual collection 
Internal corporate 
governance 
CG Internal corporate governance score Aggregate above 
seven attributes 
Bank risk-taking    
Z-score ZS [Average (Returns) + Average 
(Equity/Total assets)] / Standard 
deviation (Equity/Total assets) 
Use original 
Bankscope data to 
calculate 
Loan loss provision LLP The natural logarithm of the amount 
of loan loss reserve 
Bankscope 
Bank specific characteristics   
Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousands of USD. 
Bankscope 
Capitalization ETA The ratio of equity to assets. Bankscope 
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PE ratio PE The ratio of market price to earnings 
per share. 
Bankscope 
Return on assets ROAA The ratio of profit to average assets. Bankscope 
Depositor  LNDEP The natural logarithm of the amount 
of deposit in thousands of USD. 
Bankscope 
Macroeconomics    
GDP growth rate GDP Yearly real GDP growth (%) International 
Monetary Fund 
Inflation rate INF Inflation rate International 
Monetary Fund 
Lending interest INT Lending interest rate International 
Monetary Fund 
 
3.5 Endogeneity and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Base on the discussions of the dependent and explanatory variables, I employ 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator as robustness to test my hypotheses 
and estimate the model parameters. The GMM estimator is proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and being applied by several recent banking literatures, such as Hou et al. 
(2016) Ghosh (2015), and Bouvatier et al. (2014). As most empirical corporate finance 
research, the analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and bank risk-
taking faces the challenge of endogeneity, which can arise from unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality. The GMM estimator enables us to 
tackle these particular econometric problems: (i) the autoregressive process in the data 
relating dependent variables; (ii) the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects; and 
(iii) and the likely endogeneity of the independent variables.  
 
I employ the AR (1) and AR (2), and Hansen test to check the validity of my estimates. 
AR (1) and AR (2) are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order 
autocorrelation of the residuals. AR (1) test should reject the null hypothesis of no first 
order serial correlation, while AR (2) test should not reject the null hypothesis of no 
second order serial correlation of the residuals. Hansen test is the checking the validity 
of the entire set of instruments as a group.  
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4 Data 
4.1 Data sources 
The sample examined in my chapter includes the largest commercial listed banks in 
three markets, Mainland China, Hongkong and Taiwan, cover 9 years from 2006 to 
2014. The requirement of my observation is that the bank must be publicly traded made 
it possible to collect data on board governance as well as other internal governance 
characteristics of the firms from published statements. My sample period 2006-2014 is 
carefully chosen to avoid the impact of the 2005 reform in Mainland China2. In addition, 
most of the banks in Mainland are starting listing in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006. These banks pillar contains large nationwide 
banks and regional banks. Moreover, aggregate data for cross-market are considered 
preferable as the risk of non-representativeness of the sample is reduced. Meanwhile, 
studies based on bank-by-bank are useful in a micro-prudential context. Therefore, 
exploiting cross-market variation in risk-taking trends is likely to produce more robust 
results than the analysis of individual market. 
 
The data used in my chapter comes from three sources. My first source is the Bankscope, 
which is a leading information source for global financial institutional. All variables 
sourced from Bankscope are in US dollars, using year ended date exchange rate. Second, 
information on bank governance is particularly difficult to construct. I hand-collect 
information on various aspects of the institution structure of the corporate governance 
function at each bank each year, and use this information to construct a score to measure 
the strength of governance. These governance data are measured on the date of the 
proxy at the ending of the corresponding fiscal year3. Third, macroeconomic data are 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics with 
                                                             
2 The authority of China initiated a reform to make non-tradable shares becoming tradable in 2005. The non-tradable 
shares originally held by the State or by politically connected investors that were issued at the early stage of financial 
market development. 
3 Following Adams and Mehran (2012), we also adjust our data collection procedures to account for the fact that 
statements disclose some governance characteristics for the previous fiscal year and others for the following fiscal 
year. 
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the exception of Taiwan4.  
 
As discuss on Section 3, I obtain the score of corporate governance by taking the 
principle component of the following seven governance variables: independent 
directors, the board size, CEO duality, relationship of top 10 shareholders, managerial 
shareholding, foreign ownership and external audit firm. These components analysis 
effectively performs a singular value decomposition of the strength of bank governance. 
The main advantage of using the sum of all components analysis is that I do not have 
to subjectively eliminate any characteristics of governance, or make subjective 
judgements regarding the relative importance of these characteristics (Tetlock, 2007). 
 
Table (2) reports the number of banks and the number of bank-year observations for 
each market. Banks from Mainland China account for 36% of the total observations, 
while banks of Hongkong and Taiwan represent 15% and 49% respectively. The dataset 
thus comprises countries with different levels of development as well as different legal, 
political, and institutional environments. However, my data set is comparable with Sun 
and Chang (2011) database, they investigate the role of risk in eight emerging Asian 
countries. There are several advantages associated with my data set. The first advantage 
is that the sample includes different prospective over corporate governance, and thus 
providing potentially more complete tests of the importance of governance structures. 
Second, the managers of these banks have similar culture background in these markets, 
thus it offers a unique regional set of data for each year over the 2006-2014 period. 
Third, using panel data allows us to capture the market-specific effects and the 
unobservable differences between markets. While it is true that I examine corporate 
governance at only the very largest banks in these markets and those banks hold the 
vast majority of industry assets. Consequently, these banks command great interest 
among investors, regulators and other stakeholders. 
 
                                                             
4 Taiwanese data is sourced from either the website of the Central Bank of the Republic of China (interest rates) or 
the website of the National Statistics of the Republic of China (all other data). 
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Table 2: Number of banks in samples used for estimating risk 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Mainland 7 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 129 
Hongkong 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 54 
Taiwan 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 189 
 34 41 41 41 43 43 43 43 43 372 
 
I present summary statistics for the risk measures, governance score, bank financial 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables in Table (3). The mean Z-score of 3.13 is 
close to that mean Z-score (3.25) reported by Beltratti and Stulz (2012). The mean of 
loan loss provision is 13.113. The mean score of governance is 3.429, and the minimum 
and maximum value ranges between 1 and 6. My governance score is higher than 2.01 
from Hass et al. (2014). As the sample of Hass et al. (2014) excludes the financial sector, 
it is reasonable to believe that the governance of financial sector is stronger than other 
industries. Regarding the bank characteristics variables, bank capital ranges from 2.53% 
to 38.97% with an average 7.38%. Bank size, the logarithm of total assets ranges from 
15.42 to 21.72 with an average 18.12.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Corporate governance attributes    
1NDIV 372 0.074 0.263 0 1 
2BS 372 0.483 0.500 0 1 
3DUAL 372 0.925 0.263 0 1 
4TOP10 372 0.302 0.459 0 1 
5MH 372 0.147 0.354 0 1 
6FORE 372 0.622 0.485 0 1 
7AUDIT 372 0.868 0.338 0 1 
CG 372 3.429 0.939 1.000 6.000 
      
Panel B: Main model variables     
ZS 372 3.138 0.771 -1.442 5.308 
LLP 372 13.113 1.948 9.603 18.466 
ETA 372 7.384 5.038 2.530 38.970 
LNTA 372 18.128 1.572 15.429 21.729 
PE 372 5.227 0.739 2.838 6.602 
ROAA 372 0.761 0.665 -2.020 2.630 
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LNDEP 372 17.888 1.630 14.624 21.781 
GDP 372 5.918 4.195 -2.459 14.16 
INF 372 2.205 1.784 -0.860 5.864 
INT 372 4.625 1.526 2.560 7.900 
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. ZS is the 
Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision 
in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings 
per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. 
INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% independent directors and 0 
otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same 
person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management 
ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 
7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate 
governance by aggregate seven attributes.  
 
Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients are also calculated and reported in Table (4). 
The correlation coefficients are usually small (less than 0.4), suggesting that the 
correlation between variables has weak association. Pointedly, governance score 
exhibits a negative correlation with Z-score and loan loss reserve. The Pearson pairwise 
correlation analysis can only provide some preliminary information to the following 
regression analysis because of the ambiguous causality of the correlation coefficients 
and the omission of key control independent variables. 
 
Table 4: The matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients 
 ZS LLP CG LNTA ETA PE ROAA LNDEP 
ZS 1.0000         
LLP 0.3908* 1.0000        
CG -0.1656* -0.3809* 1.0000       
LNTA 0.0123 -0.2776* 0.0016 1.0000      
ETA 0.4027* 0.9400* -0.3659* -0.2499* 1.0000     
PE 0.4313* 0.7247* -0.4085* -0.0754 0.7577* 1.0000   
ROAA 0.3122* 0.3146* -0.1604* 0.2676* 0.4007* 0.4143*  1.0000   
LNDEP 0.4149* 0.9497* -0.3578* -0.3116* 0.9814* 0.7469* 0.4001* 1.0000  
GDP 0.2462* 0.5207* -0.3951* -0.1803* 0.4423* 0.4138* 0.2551* 0.4718* 
INF 0.1727* 0.2438* -0.1875* -0.0467 0.2771* 0.2436* 0.2182* 0.3008* 
INT 0.3052* 0.4709* -0.4020* -0.1470* 0.4871* 0.4384* 0.3546* 0.5303* 
         
 GDP INF INT      
GDP 1.0000         
INF 0.3198* 1.0000        
INT 0.6077* 0.5529* 1.0000       
         
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
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is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Governance and risk taking - OLS estimation 
The empirical evidence of the relationship between bank performance and governance 
are presented in this section. Table (5) reports the estimation results of Equation (2) to 
test the relationship between the corporate governance (CG) and bank risk taking (Z-
score) by OLS estimation. In specifications (1) and (2) of Table (5), macroeconomic 
control variables are excluded from the estimations because it is statistically 
insignificant in most specifications. The regression results are reported in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table (5) are consistent with those in columns (1) and (2) of Table (5). 
 
Table 5: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk taking (Z-score) - 
OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -1.244** -1.355** -1.337** -1.360**  
   (-2.53) (-2.42) (-2.55) (-2.43)    
ETA   2.006*** 1.926*** 1.976*** 1.936*** 
   (15.76) (13.21) (14.45) (13.30) 
LNTA   -8.188*** -9.708*** -8.053*** -9.541*** 
   (-2.77) (-2.94) (-2.58) (-2.92)    
PE   -0.564 0.223 -0.291 0.455 
   (-1.10) (0.36) (-0.51) (0.72) 
ROAA   1.091*** 1.010** 1.180*** 0.979**  
   (2.90) (2.20) (2.84) (2.12) 
LNDEP   9.716*** 10.86*** 10.02*** 11.09*** 
   (3.28) (3.31) (3.21) (3.4) 
GDP     0.027 0.104 
     (0.42) (0.73) 
INF     0.167 0.575*   
     (1.29) (1.96) 
INT     0.322 -0.171 
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     (1.15) (-0.33)    
Constant   -1.004 3.668 -11.79 -5.061 
   (-0.10) (0.24) (-1.07) (-0.30)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.547 0.588 0.550 0.590 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
With regard to the determinant of Z-score as dependent variable, I find relatively strong 
evidence that the coefficient estimates on corporate governance are negative and 
significant on all specifications in Table (5). This finding confirms the Hypothesis (2). 
This illustrates that, after controlling for other bank characteristics and macro-economic 
factors, a bank with strong governance is associated with a higher risk taking. More 
specification, a 1-standarad deviation increase in CG is associated with around 1.22 to 
1.36 increase in the bank risk taking. This result is consistent with the evidence by 
Pathan (2009) and Elyasiani and Zhang (2015). 
 
The board of directors is widely recognized as the cornerstone of an effective 
governance framework. The board could evaluate whether the current and future risk-
exposure is consistent with risk appetite by monitoring and advising bank operation. 
Most banks can be viewed as complexity and opacity based on revenue diversification 
and debt intensity. Thus, banks are likely to require more advising from their boards. 
My result confirms that an intermediate board with a greater number of independent 
directors is more effectively monitor and advise bank’s management team (Liang et al., 
2013), in turn leads bank to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investment. From an 
opposite direction, my results support the claim of both Pathan (2009) and Wang and 
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Hsu (2013), who finds that a small board associated with higher risk of bank. Besides, 
larger boards are also less effective more susceptible by influencing from CEO. In 
addition, as independent directors pay more attention to the regulatory and statutory 
issue, therefore, managers would act more conservatively to avoid any lawsuits (Pathan, 
2009). Bank directors are likely exposed to high penalties imposed by regulators for 
violating fiduciary duties. Besides, recent discussion suggests that independent board 
may become less effective as they attend ‘too many’ boards. However, Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015) suggest that many directors serve on too many boards to fulfill their 
duties adequately and the relation between bank risk and busyness board is negative. 
Besides, Wang and Hsu (2013) also suggest that banks with a higher proportion of 
independent directors are less likely to suffer from fraud or failure to comply with 
professional obligations to clients. Thus, my result is consistent with the finding of 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Wang and Hsu (2013), which are the board with more 
outside member lead to higher risk taking. Moreover, separated CEO and chair could 
be one of explanation for the strong governance and lower bank risk-taking. As 
individual has a more complex job and merits a higher equilibrium wage if CEO and 
chair duality, I might expect increases in the level of job complexity and monitoring 
quality falls. Thus, these CEOs may slack to monitor and advise on bank risk taking.  
 
Second, another possible explanation might be that banks with managerial shareholding 
and foreign ownership can serve as catalyst to control bank risk taking. Agency 
problems and risk preference behavior are different depending on the nature and 
incentive of the shareholder (Barry et al., 2011; Saunders et al., 1990). If a bank is 
managed to maximize investor return, it will choose a level of risk that is consistent 
with that objective. This because managers seeking to improve the profitability might 
implement certain strategies that raise the uncertainty of the firms' income, such as 
introducing new production technologies, cutting expenses and tightening controls on 
production. Besides, shareholders may not be able to commit to monitor such complex 
contracts and projects (Bolton et al., 2015). Sullivan and Spong (2007) find that 
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managerial shareholding is positively linked with bank risk, meaning that under certain 
conditions, hired managers operate their bank more closely in line with stockholder 
interests. The limited liability shareholders have great incentive to increase the risk 
taking of the bank by increasing leverage to maximize their wealth. In contrast, 
managers may act in a risk-averse rather than chasing risk due to non-diversifiable 
human capital. Therefore, bank with part managerially shareholding exhibit higher risk 
taking behavior than stockholder controlled banks (Saunders et al., 1990). My result is 
consistent with the finding of Saunders et al. (1990). In addition, foreigners have 
ownership structures that are conductive to governance problems (Leuz et al., 2010). 
Given the financial resources and managerial know-how, foreign investors are more 
likely to improve the level of corporate governance through monitoring managers 
effectively. As the consequence, bank with foreign shareholders would be more 
efficient due to the strength of governance, while operating in higher risk.  
 
Third, DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) claim that risk management is central to banks’ 
operating policies as banks with risky assets use risk management to maximize their 
capacity. The risk management function is performed by the asset and liability 
management committee of the board of directors. The main function of risk 
management at banks is to limit exposure to risk, and hence to reduce the possibility of 
significant losses. Most operational losses in bank can be characterized as consequences 
of a weak internal control environment (Chernobai et al., 2012). Thus, risk management 
system can ensure that the bank has the appropriate risk level, for example, ceiling 
increases risk or eliminating uncover risk. Indeed, risk management system would 
strike the balance between helping bank take risks efficiently and ensuring not take 
excessive risks that destroy value. For instance, bank with a greater percentage of 
financial experts among management team can engage in higher risk-taking activities 
because they have better understanding of more complex investments (Minton et al., 
2014). Besides, the presence of a chief risk officer in a bank’s executive board and 
whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated 
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with a better bank performance (Aebi et al., 2012). Therefore, consistent with my 
finding, banks with strong corporate governance normally associated with better risk 
management system, in turn raising risk-taking (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).  
 
Fourth, depositors discipline could also be one of the reasons to explain the positive 
relationship between corporate governance and bank risk taking. Deposit insurance 
protects the interests of unsophisticated depositors and helps prevent bank failure. The 
banking sector is dominated by large state-owned banks in those emerging economy, 
especially in China. Those commercials banks are under strict government regulations 
and guaranteed by government safety net. However, Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002) finds that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking 
crises. Anginer et al. (2014) suggest that the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance 
dominates in good times, while the stabilization effect of deposit insurance dominates 
in turbulent times. Thus, strong governance bank may focus on maximize shareholders’ 
wealth mainly and neglect the interest of depositor, which would to take on excessive 
risk in normal time. 
 
Summing up, as my sample represent all major banks in the three markets, my result is 
consistent with the conjectural on corporate, which in turn allow these banks to monitor 
and control their risk taking in an appropriate level. My result is in line with corporate 
firm evidence by Core et al. (1999), who suggest that board and ownership structure 
are associated with the level of firm risk in term of managerial compensation. Besides, 
my result also consistent with the finding of John et al. (2008), they conclude that 
corporate risk-taking is positively related to the quality of investor protection. The 
results support the hypothesis (2), better corporate governance increased bank risk 
taking. This finding is in line with other published papers using data from other markets 
(e.g. Pathan, 2009 and Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). 
 
Concerning the control variables, not surprisingly, size is an important determinant of 
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bank risk-taking. From table (5), I find that the coefficients of bank size are positively 
and statistically significant. This indicates that larger banks have lower risk than smaller 
banks, which consistent with the finding of Pathan (2009). The results do not support 
the argument for ‘too big to fail’, where large banks have greater incentive to take 
higher risk (Haq and Heaney, 2012; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013). A possible explanation for this relation is that the larger banks likely to have 
strong risk management function (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
 
The coefficients on the ratio of equity to asset are negative and statistically significant 
for all specifications. More specifically, a 1% rise in equity to assets, capturing the 
extent of capitalization, decreases Z-score by 1–15%. These findings suggest that an 
increase in bank capital associated with rise in bank risk taking, which consistent with 
the argument that careful management of bank capital can control bank risk taking. My 
result is in accordance with some of the prior studies such as Haq and Heaney, (2012). 
However, my results are contrary to the results obtained in Konishi and Yasuda (2004), 
who found a positive correlation between the capital equity and the level of bank risk. 
 
Some-what surprisingly, greater price to earning ratio negatively influences Z-score, 
suggesting a higher share price increases bank risk taking. This implies that banks in 
favorite stock market engaged in less prudent lending and not carefully originate their 
loans, in turn increasing risk. The possible explanation is that excess bank risk taking 
is induced by management compensation base on the stock price performance (Bolton 
et al., 2015).  
 
Turning to the regional economic determinants, the coefficients on the GDP growth are 
negative and statistically significant for two specifications. This suggests that increased 
economic growth is found to be associated with increased bank risk.  
 
Overall, my economic model has strong predictive power: R-square of the regression 
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implies that the variables explain between 11.1% and 17.3% of the variation in risk 
taking, net of any effect they may have through the other independent variables. In 
addition, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on both instruments 
are jointly zero. However, the joint determination of corporate governance and risk 
taking raise concern that the result could bias. For instance, high risk banks might from 
better governance structure if disperse shareholders have difficulty monitoring risky 
investment. In the estimation equation R = b * C + u, R represent bank risk taking 
variable, C the matrix of all independent variables, u the error term, and b the vector of 
estimated coefficients. OLS is consistent only if no unobservable factors affect both 
governance and risk. I attempt this concern using a variety of strategies in following 
sections.  
 
5.2 Governance and risk taking - Fixed-effect within estimation 
The OLS estimation may not consistent due to it does not consider the unobservable 
and constant heterogeneity of the bank. Therefore, in the presence of unobserved bank 
fixed-effect, panel‘Fixed-effect’ (FE) estimation is commonly suggested (Wooldridge, 
2002, pp. 265–291, for details on FE estimation). By including bank fixed effects, I 
limit both omitted variables bias and the effect of potential outliers caused by the fact 
that the number of cross-sectional units in my sample is small. FE estimation is 
consistent only if the independent variables are exogenous, which is not the case in the 
analysis of corporate governance and bank risk taking. Many other previous papers use 
either this estimation in research on corporate governance or risk (Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Pathan, 2009; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Finally, 
Hausman test is used to identify the optimal model compare with random effect. The 
result shown in Tables (6) suggest that the fixed effects model is the optimal one. 
 
Table 6: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk taking (Z-score) - FE 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -1.155** -0.970** -1.173** -1.054**  
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   (-2.36) (-2.06) (-2.40) (-2.22)    
ETA   2.027*** 1.971*** 2.017*** 1.962*** 
   (16.01) (16.02) (15.79) (15.77) 
LNTA   -7.998*** -9.854*** -7.799*** -9.697*** 
   (-2.69) (-3.41) (-2.62) (-3.35)    
PE   -0.622 -0.0683 -0.479 0.0443 
   (-1.22) (-0.14) (-0.92) -0.08 
ROAA   1.087*** 0.812** 1.151*** 0.885**  
   (2.93) (2.16) (3.02) (2.31) 
LNDEP   9.358*** 9.225*** 9.335*** 9.426*** 
   (3.14) (3.21) (3.13) (3.26) 
GDP     0.017 -0.075 
     (0.29) (-0.61)    
INF     0.164 0.279 
     (1.38) (1.12) 
INT     0.171 -0.526 
     (0.65) (-1.20)    
Constant   -1.168 31.68** -6.207 28.33*   
   (-0.13) (2.23) (-0.62) -1.77 
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.548 0.598 0.552 0.602 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is 
loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman 
and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders and 0 otherwise. 
5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor ownership is 
greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures and 0 otherwise. 
CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Table (6) reports the estimation results of Equation (3) to test the relationship between 
CG and Z-score using the FE estimation. As before, the coefficients on the CG is not 
significantly different from zero. I still find relatively strong evidence that the 
coefficients on CG are negative and significant on all specifications in Table (6). This 
illustrates that, after controlling for unobserved bank fixed effect, a bank with strong 
governance is associated with a higher risk taking. Thus, the second Hypothesis (H2) 
is also supported. A 1-standarad deviation increase in CG is associated with around 0.97 
to 1.16 increase in the bank risk taking, which is little smaller than OLS estimation. 
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Corporate governance plays a proactive role through directors’ meetings to discuss and 
exchange ideas on how to monitor and advise managers, which could subsequently 
influence bank risk taking. 
 
5.3 Governance and risk taking - GMM estimation 
The OLS and fixed effect estimators are neither econometrically consistent nor related 
with the theoretical postulates of corporate governance literature. Besides, those 
estimators could be problematic because risk-taking can be endogenous. The 
endogeneity concern arises because greater risk-taking may be likely in banks operating 
in markets with higher growth rates, that is, risk-taking and growth could be driven by 
a potential variable. Thus, I need other econometric technique able take account at the 
same time the individual characteristics of each bank together with the potential 
endogeneity of governance characteristics.  
 
The two step system GMM estimator with adjusted standard errors considers the 
unobservable heterogeneity transforming the original variables into first differences and 
the endogeneity of independent variables using instruments. Table (7) present the two 
step system GMM results of bank risk measure as Z-score. I present estimated 
coefficients whether they are statistically different from zero (p-value). Besides, the 
diagnostics tests in Table (7) show that the model is well fitted with statistically 
insignificant test statistics for both second-order autocorrelation in second differences 
(AR 2) and Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. Besides, the residuals in 
the first difference (AR 1) are statistically significant, which is serially correlated by 
way of construction.  
 
Table 7: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk taking (Z-score) - 
GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   DIFF SYS DIFF SYS 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
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Lag.ZS   0.045*** 0.737*** 0.143*** 0.966*** 
   (4.22) (21.76) (6.16) (42.46) 
CG   -0.400** -0.652 -1.002** -0.159*   
   (-2.04) (-1.46) (-2.18) (-1.82)    
ETA   2.323*** 0.177*** 1.476*** -0.118*   
   (11.10) (3.37) (12.25) (-2.00)    
LNTA   -5.010*** 0.31 -4.330** -0.479 
   (-3.63) (0.29) (-2.68) (-1.58)    
PE   -0.526*** -5.251*** 0.905 -0.941**  
   (-5.62) (-6.12) (0.98) (-2.68)    
ROAA   2.258*** 0.471 1.144*** 0.092 
   (16.13) (0.68) (9.18) (0.23) 
LNDEP   6.402*** 2.896** 4.274*** 1.516*** 
   (4.56) (2.40) (3.42) (4.26) 
GDP     -0.275*** -0.416*** 
     (-4.98) (-13.15)    
INF     0.507*** 1.199*** 
     (5.60) (9.49) 
INT     -1.180*** -0.643*** 
     (-4.93) (-3.84)    
Constant    -21.73***  -7.331*** 
    (-5.20)  (-2.75)    
       
Observation   279 321 279 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1   0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR2   0.294 0.946 0.805 0.371 
Hansan   0.998 0.828 1.000 0.682 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
With regard to the determinant of Z-score as dependent variable, I find relatively strong 
evidence that the coefficient estimates on corporate governance are negative and 
significant on all columns. This illustrates that, after controlling for other bank 
characteristics and macro-economic factors, a bank with strong governance is 
associated with higher risk taking. This result supports the hypothesis (2) that bank 
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governance play a role that is more proactive than reactive. In addition, the results in 
Table (7) provide at least some assurance that the negative association between bank 
governance and risk taking is not being induced by obvious model misspecification. 
 
5.4 Governance components and risk taking - OLS estimation 
As corporate governance components tend to be highly correlated, correlated omitted 
variables remain a concern in this chapter. I attempt to mitigate this concern by focusing 
on how the individual components affect risk taking. In Table (8), I replace the 
aggregate governance score with individual components to test the relationship between 
bank governance and risk taking. The coefficients on these bank attributes variables 
offer some important insights. Among seven attributes of corporate governance, board 
size (2BS) has a negative coefficient across different specifications, which supports that 
intermediate board bank boards (greater than 6 but fewer than 13) involve with more 
risk-taking. This result is consistent with the evidence by Pathan (2009) and De Andres 
and Vallelado (2008) in banking sector. 
 
The governance literature argues that the optimal board size should balance advisory 
needs with the costs of decision-making. More directors in boards are able to assign 
more people to supervise and monitor on management decisions. Especially for 
independent directors, they should be endowed with the knowledge, incentive and 
abilities to discipline and advise managers, thus enabling to reduce the conflicts of 
interest between insiders and shareholders. Large banks have many subsidiary boards 
makes the role of the parent board in dealing with complexity less clear. Adams and 
Mehran (2012) argue that large boards may be beneficial due to additions of directors 
with subsidiary directorships may add value as complexity increases. Small board may 
not able to monitor the complexity organization. Nevertheless, larger boards are not 
more valuable over time. Complexity can explain the positive relation between board 
size and risk taking due to banks engage diversify activities while increase risk exposure 
over time. In addition, negative relation between bank performance and board size is 
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commonly finding in previous literatures due to less communication and coordination. 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) find a negative relationship between BHC market based 
risk measures and busy boards, indicating that BHCs with more busy directors have 
lower total, market, and idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, since shareholders have 
incentives to take more risk, strong bank boards (measured by board size) can be 
expected to associated with bank risk taking positively. 
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Table 8: The relationship between the composition of corporate governance and risk taking (Z-score) - OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 
varivariable 
 ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS 
           
1INDIV   -0.017       0.628 
   (-0.01)       (0.45) 
2BS    -1.996***      -1.390**  
    (-2.77)      (-1.99)  
3DUAL     6.619***     6.821*** 
     (3.61)     (3.73) 
4TOP10      18.61***    19.50*** 
      (2.95)    (2.74)  
5 MH       -5.644   1.996  
       (-0.73)     (0.24) 
6FORE        0.086  0.659 
        (0.07)  (0.53) 
7AUDIT         -2.474 -3.378**  
         (-1.58) (-2.22)  
ETA   1.881*** 1.844*** 1.825*** 1.889*** 1.881*** 1.884*** 1.896*** 1.832*** 
   (13.09) (13.04) (13.07) (13.28) (13.22) (13.19) (13.35) (13.44) 
LNTA   -9.277*** -8.572*** -9.662*** -10.41*** -9.544*** -9.292*** -9.138*** -9.864*** 
   (-2.90) (-2.71) (-3.11) (-3.25) (-2.98) (-2.91) (-2.88) (-3.23) 
PE   0.190 0.209 0.227 0.155 0.176 0.190 0.168 0.215  
   (0.30) (0.34) (0.38) (0.25) (0.28) (0.31) (0.27) (0.37)  
ROAA   0.961** 1.004** 0.933** 0.915** 0.956** 0.959** 0.931** 0.889**  
   (2.11) (2.26) (2.13) (2.03) (2.13) (2.13) (2.07) (2.09) 
LNDEP   8.704*** 8.091** 8.224*** 9.366*** 8.882*** 8.722*** 9.150*** 8.897*** 
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   (2.69) (2.54) (2.62) (2.91) (2.76) (2.71) (2.85) (2.90)  
GDP   -0.0604 -0.0971 -0.133 -0.0776 -0.0638 -0.0593 -0.0704 -0.183 
   (-0.42) (-0.68) (-0.94) (-0.54) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-1.32) 
INF   0.243 0.290 0.0610 0.205 0.236 0.245 0.247 0.0652  
   (0.82) (1.00) (0.21) (0.70) (0.81) (0.83) (0.85) (0.23) 
INT   -0.519 -0.536 -0.757 -0.458 -0.508 -0.520 -0.477 -0.658  
   (-0.99) (-1.05) (-1.50) (-0.89) (-0.99) (-1.01) (-0.93) (-1.34) 
Constant   20.95 21.13 31.07* 19.28 23.90 20.84 13.16 15.84  
   (1.23) (1.26) (1.85) (1.14) (1.37) (1.21) (0.75) (0.89)  
           
Year effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.594 0.605 0.616 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.601 0.634 
           
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of 
equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending 
interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same person and 
0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor ownership is greater 
than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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An alternative explanation for why banks with more board members experienced high 
risk taking is that board members encouraged managers to raise equity capital during 
the crisis period to avoid regulatory intervention. However, raising equity capital is 
costly during the crisis period and may cause a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
debtholders. Erkens et al. (2012) find that the wealth transfer from existing shareholders 
to debtholders due to equity capital raisings was substantial. Non-equity stakeholders 
such as debtholders and regulators, which often prefer conservative investment, may 
influence investment policy for their own benefit. The conflicts between bank manager 
and shareholders would lead to risk taking varies within different corporate governance 
structure (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Strong governance dampens the magnitude and 
the importance of private benefit to those stakeholders, resulting in less forgoing of 
positive net present value risky investment.  
 
The coefficient on board independence is insignificant, which is consistent with the 
finding of Erkens et al., (2012). If a bank with more independent board members, 
strategic decisions should improve due to the counseling skills of the members 
complement those of the CEO. Adams and Mehran (2012) also find that board 
independence is not related to bank performance. My result is in contrast to the work 
of Minton et al. (2014), they find that the fraction of independent financial experts is 
positively related to several measures of risk for U.S. commercial bank. Besides, Liang 
et al. (2013) also suggest that the proportion of independent direct has significantly 
positive impacts on bank asset quality. However, I focus exclusively on the markets 
where data about insolvency risk is widely available.  
 
In addition, the Big 4 Audit firm (7AUDIT) also has a negative coefficient across 
different specifications, which supports that banks with audited by Big 4 audit firm 
involve with more risk-taking. Agency theory suggests that managers have incentives 
to avoid risk, while shareholders prefer excessive risk. Firms with weaker governance 
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structures have greater agency problems, as a result perform worse (Core et al., 1999). 
If a bank is audited by an industry specialist for the controlling accounting quality, 
which may encourage shareholder-focused corporate risk-taking. Shareholders are 
reluctant to monitor the complex accounting information due to a commitment problem 
that may be exacerbated by unobservable tail risk (Bolton et al., 2015). Banks audited 
by a Big 4 audit firm display a high financial stability than banks audited by non-Big 4 
audit firm. My result thus in line with Bouvatier et al. (2014), they find that Big 4 firms 
do not contribute to improving the quality of banks’ financial statement. Thus, high 
quality auditing could enhance bank governance and thus act as one of mechanisms to 
associated with higher bank risk-taking.  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between top 10 shareholders (4TOP10) has a positive 
coefficient across different specifications. These findings suggest that banks with no 
relationship among top 10 shareholders associated with lower risk taking. The results 
largely consistent with the findings in Laeven and Levine (2009), who find that bank 
risk is generally higher in banks that have large owners with substantial cash flow rights. 
Larger shareholders have power and incentives to reduce the discretions enjoyed by 
managers. Besides, other stakeholders have less incentive in monitoring bank risk 
taking for their self-interest (Bolton et al., 2015). Better corporate governance mitigates 
the risk of taking of private benefits from larger shareholder (Morck et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, the dominant shareholders may instruct lower-layer departments to take 
less risks and tunnel gains to upper-layer departments in a pyramid of banks. Therefore, 
bank with strength of corporate governance, represent as no relationship among top 10 
shareholders, associated with lower risk taking.  
 
5.5 Governance components and risk taking - GMM estimation 
Following De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Liang et al. (2013), the generalized 
method of moments (GMMs) is being used to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem for each governance components and risk taking. Table (9) reports the result 
42 
 
from two-step system estimator with adjusted standard error for potential 
heteroskedasticity proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
It is well recognizing that the GMM estimation can take accounts for the unobserved 
heterogeneity and the dynamic nature of panel data. I use lagged governance component 
variables and lagged other control variables as instruments. The intuition is that 
governance variables in earlier years could not have resulted from bank risk taking in 
subsequent years. Therefore, endogeneity concern is unlikely. Since out sample size is 
not large, I use the adjustment for small sample as in Windmeijer (2005). 
 
The column (2) of Table (9) shows that board size (2BS) has a significantly negative 
relationship with Z-score at the 1% level across different specifications, which is 
consistent with above OLS finding and a number of empirical studies (e.g. Anginer et 
al., 2016; Pathan, 2009; and De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The strong negative 
relationships suggest that intermediate boards represent efficient governance and align 
with the shareholder’s preference on bank risk taking. 
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Table 9: The relationship between the composition of corporate governance and bank risk (Z-score) - GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS 
Lag.ZS   0.950*** 0.943*** 0.955*** 0.949*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.949*** 0.895*** 
   (200.32) (81.87) (237.00) (196.44) (158.54) (167.11) (163.89) (24.30)  
1INDIV   -0.139       -0.394 
   (-0.28)       (-0.23)    
2BS    -0.463*      -2.243*   
    (-1.76)      (-1.89)    
3DUAL     -2.003***     -2.221 
     (-4.38)     (-0.75)    
4TOP10      0.166    2.683 
      (0.77)    (1.65) 
5MH       -0.461   -2.244 
       (-1.17)   (-1.51)    
6FORE        0.295  4.302*   
        (1.00)  (1.71) 
7AUDIT         0.167 1.705 
         (0.66) (1.21) 
ETA   -0.099*** -0.129*** -0.104*** -0.096*** -0.100*** -0.113** -0.076*** 0.131*** 
   (-4.76) (-3.47) (-2.90) (-3.82) (-4.95) (-2.67) (-3.37) (5.48)  
LNTA   0.635*** 0.144 0.702*** 0.537* 0.544* 0.813** 0.655** -1.548 
   (2.78) (0.66) (2.88) (1.99) (2.00) (2.69) (2.50) (-1.56)  
PE   -4.045*** -3.009*** -4.128*** -3.954*** -4.101*** -3.974*** -3.825*** -2.042*** 
   (-15.50) (-4.79) (-23.03) (-13.99) (-16.44) (-16.91) (-13.97) (-3.19) 
ROAA   1.946*** 1.833*** 1.783*** 1.923*** 1.869*** 1.816*** 1.592*** 1.139*** 
   (8.26) (5.16) (10.00) (7.84) (8.46) (6.87) (6.29) (3.97)  
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LNDEP   1.089*** 1.165*** 1.017*** 1.130*** 1.148*** 0.896*** 1.028*** 2.558**  
   (4.87) (5.42) (4.24) (4.36) (4.46) (2.99) (4.56) (2.52)  
GDP   0.006 0.046** 0.016 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.017 
   (0.40) (2.39) (0.96) (0.28) (0.40) (0.50) (0.39) (0.81) 
INF   0.079*** 0.141** 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.054** 0.248*** 
   (5.12) (2.70) (4.30) (4.35) (3.52) (2.84) (2.70) (2.75) 
INT   -0.179** -0.429*** -0.194** -0.164** -0.174** -0.167* -0.0957 -0.493*** 
   (-2.53) (-3.13) (-2.28) (-2.14) (-2.06) (-1.94) (-0.86) (-5.34)  
Constant   -8.068*** -4.483 -5.549*** -7.585*** -7.120*** -8.345*** -8.817*** -5.304 
   (-6.87) (-1.31) (-3.95) (-5.94) (-5.37) (-6.73) (-6.59) (-1.09) 
           
Observations   321 321 321 321 321 321 321 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar2   0.564 0.382 0.565 0.559 0.573 0.539 0.505 0.319  
Hansen   0.746 1.000 0.764 0.738 0.760 0.752 0.732 1.000  
 
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of 
equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending 
interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same person and 
0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor ownership is greater 
than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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The column (3) of Table (9) illustrates the effects of CEO chairman duality (3DUAL) on 
bank risk taking. The result shows that the CEO chairman duality has a significantly 
negative effect on the bank risk taking, meaning that banks operating in non CEO 
chairman duality are more risk taking than those operating in CEO chairman duality 
structure. The result is consistent with the evidence of Pathan (2009), which find that 
CEO power (CEO’s ability to control board decision) negatively affects bank risk 
taking. The presence of CEO chairman duality may result in greater managerial 
discretion to implement conservative investment strategy. This can give rise to a 
negative relation between governance and risk taking. In addition, Anginer et al. (2016) 
also find that banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance, in terms of 
separation of the CEO and chairman roles, is associated with higher risk taking, and the 
relationship is especially strong for banks located in developed countries. A board not 
chaired by the CEO is less easily captured by management, and expected to choose 
riskier investment as the risk taking incentives of shareholders. More risky investments 
may increase the expected value of shareholders’ wealth, analogously to the positive 
effect on stock market valuation.  
 
5.6 Interactive effects: corporate governance and bank performance 
So far, I have investigated the effect of corporate governance on bank risk taking 
controlling for other control variables. I follow up with additional investigation with 
possible interaction effects of corporate governance and bank performance on risk 
taking. To do this analysis, I have defined variables to measure the interaction effects. 
I construct one main variables CG*ROAA, which is constructed by the interaction 
between the score of governance and the return on average asset. Table (10) reports the 
estimation results of Equation (3) to test the relationship between the interaction term 
(CG*ROAA) and bank risk taking by OLS estimation. 
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Table 10: The relationship between the interaction term and risk taking (Z-score) - OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -0.257 -0.415 -0.392 -0.473 
   (-0.42) (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.67)    
ETA   2.010*** 1.921*** 1.978*** 1.933*** 
   (15.98) (13.30) (14.63) (13.41) 
LNTA   -8.617*** -10.21*** -8.479*** -10.02*** 
   (-2.94) (-3.11) (-2.74) (-3.08)    
PE   -0.392 0.344 -0.164 0.53 
   (-0.77) (0.56) (-0.29) (0.85) 
ROAA   4.734*** 4.467*** 4.666*** 4.187**  
   (3.31) (2.66) (3.02) (2.51) 
LNDEP   10.08*** 11.03*** 10.32*** 11.23*** 
   (3.43) (3.39) (3.34) (3.47) 
CG*ROAA   -0.962*** -0.921** -0.923** -0.857**  
   (-2.64) (-2.14) (-2.34) (-2.00)    
GDP     0.025 0.108 
     (0.38) (0.76) 
INF     0.179 0.508*   
     (1.40) (1.74) 
INT     0.238 -0.15 
     (0.85) (-0.29)    
Constant   -4.400 5.235 -13.42 -2.88 
   (-0.45) (0.34) (-1.22) (-0.17)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.557 0.599 0.560 0.600 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
The coefficients of CG*ROAA variable in Table (10) regressions were negative and 
significant at least at the 5% level. These results indicate that the increase in bank 
governance level while having a better performance enhanced bank risk taking 
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significantly, and the results remain significant even after controlling for the size and 
other bank characteristics. This finding confirms hypothesis (4). Results were 
consistent in the risk estimates i.e., in the Table (5), (6) and (7) regressions with the 
expected sign and significant statistical significance. 
 
In Table (11), I present the firm fixed effects estimates (with t-statistics adjusted for 
firm level clustering). The fixed effects estimations go a long way toward dismissing 
omitted variables explanations as sources of endogeneity. As the result, there is still 
evidence of a negative relation between the interaction term (CG*ROAA) and bank risk 
taking.  
 
Table 11: The relationship between the interaction term and risk taking (Z-score) - FE 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -0.172 0.114 -0.201 -0.002 
   (-0.28) (0.19) (-0.33) (-0.00)    
ETA   2.030*** 1.963*** 2.017*** 1.956*** 
   (16.20) (16.16) (15.94) (15.89) 
LNTA   -8.454*** -10.53*** -8.280*** -10.35*** 
   (-2.87) (-3.68) (-2.80) (-3.61)    
PE   -0.447 0.0709 -0.342 0.132 
   (-0.88) (0.14) (-0.66) (0.25) 
ROAA   4.725*** 4.735*** 4.734*** 4.617*** 
   (3.34) (3.44) (3.32) (3.33) 
LNDEP   9.754*** 9.471*** 9.699*** 9.605*** 
   (3.30) (3.33) (3.28) (3.36) 
CG*ROAA   -0.961*** -1.046*** -0.949*** -0.998*** 
   (-2.66) (-2.96) (-2.61) (-2.80)    
GDP     0.0154 -0.073 
     (0.25) (-0.60)    
INF     0.177 0.194 
     (1.50) (0.78) 
INT     0.088 -0.495 
     (0.34) (-1.14)    
Constant   -4.67 34.36** -8.071 32.22**  
   (-0.54) (2.44) (-0.81) -2.02 
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Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.558 0.609 0.562 0.612 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
In Table (12), I present the GMM estimates (with difference and system GMM). Again, 
there is evidence of a negative relation between the interaction term (CG*ROAA) and 
bank risk taking. The investigations of the combined impact of corporate governance 
and performance on bank risk taking strengthened my previous findings of individual 
effects of corporate governance on bank risk. Most of the other bank-level 
characteristics enter with their expected signs and are usually consistent with the 
literature on bank risk determinants. 
 
Table 12: The relationship between the interaction term and risk taking (Z-score) - GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   DIFF SYS DIFF SYS 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
Lag.ZS   -0.100*** 0.907*** 0.084*** 0.915*** 
   (-5.84) (181.90) (3.76) (18.51) 
CG   -1.415* 0.123 2.790*** 0.631 
   (-1.74) (0.47) (7.71) (1.12) 
ETA   3.942*** -0.189*** 1.630*** -0.192**  
   (22.49) (-7.26) (8.04) (-2.68)    
LNTA   5.650*** -0.231 -12.53*** -1.489*   
   (3.18) (-0.74) (-4.35) (-1.85)    
PE   0.069 -1.474*** 1.138 1.477 
   (0.62) (-17.99) (1.61) (1.02) 
ROAA   6.605*** 6.575*** 10.26*** 5.574**  
   (3.95) (12.12) (7.06) (2.11) 
LNDEP   -2.877** 1.457*** 10.99*** 1.844**  
   (-2.03) (4.41) (3.81) (2.15) 
CG*ROAA   -1.634*** -1.261*** -2.218*** -1.107*   
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   (-3.48) (-6.82) (-5.39) (-1.87)    
GDP     -0.065 -0.461*** 
     (-1.58) (-3.09)    
INF     0.430*** 1.083*** 
     (3.28) (5.25) 
INT     -1.594*** -0.791**  
     (-5.92) (-2.29)    
Constant    -11.33***  -8.409 
    (-8.24)  (-0.77)    
       
Observation   279 321 279 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1   0.033 0.003 0.027 0.000 
Ar2   0.552 0.631 0.581 0.474 
Hansen   0.732 0.562 1.000 1.000 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Overall, the estimations presented above were relatively robust under different 
specifications. I concern the fact that the endogeneity problem associated with 
governance variable in the regression may be a potential limitation to make any 
conclusive comments. I attempt to correct this problem by using the GMM estimation 
and the result is very close of the OLS and FE estimation. Also the chapter may suffer 
from self-selectivity bias and again lack of data did not give us the opportunity to 
provide further detailed robustness test. I mitigate this selection bias problem by using 
the alternative risk taking variable and the results were similar to those of the Z-score 
regressions. 
 
 
6 Robustness test 
I have conducted several additional tests to check the robustness of my results. First, I 
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re-estimate equation (2) using pooled-OLS with clustered standard errors on an 
alternative risk taking measure, loan loss provision (LLP), while controlling for the 
effect bank characteristics and other macroeconomic factors. In addition, the F-test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on both variables are jointly zero. The 
results of Table (13) shows that governance still has a significant effect on bank risk 
taking.  
 
Table 13: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk taking (Loan loss 
provision) - OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP 
CG   -0.106*** -0.041 -0.102*** -0.046* 
   (-3.08) (-1.42) (-2.87) (-1.69)    
ETA   0.015* 0.018*** 0.017** 0.017*** 
   (1.83) (2.84) (2.06) (2.62) 
LNTA   0.656*** 0.347*** 0.388*** 0.358*** 
   (3.62) (2.95) (2.59) (3.03) 
PE   -0.029 -0.015 -0.007 -0.025 
   (-0.75) (-0.42) (-0.17) (-0.68)    
ROAA   -0.087*** -0.064** -0.111*** -0.054*   
   (-3.02) (-2.26) (-3.25) (-1.89)    
LNDEP   0.376** 0.637*** 0.707*** 0.614*** 
   (2.08) (5.22) (4.72) (4.99) 
GDP     -0.001 -0.018**  
     (-0.23) (-2.03)    
INF     -0.007 -0.027 
     (-0.68) (-1.47)    
INT     0.029 -0.026 
     (1.41) (-0.79)    
Constant   -5.070*** -4.424*** -6.365*** -3.927*** 
   (-8.75) (-7.89) (-11.61) (-6.54)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.692 0.718 0.685 0.725 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
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independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Second, I re-estimate equation (2) using fixed effect estimation on the loan loss 
provision in Table (14) as the pooled-OLS specification could be problematic because 
risk taking can be endogenous. The results are unchanged after the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects, suggesting that time invariant unobserved firm characteristics cannot 
explain my empirical findings. My results are robust to the alternative risk taking 
measure in terms of economic and statistical significance. Results show that a negative 
correlation between corporate governance and bank risk taking remains strong after 
controlling for a long list of possible covariates.  
 
Table 14: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk taking (Loan loss 
provision) - FE 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP 
CG   -0.078** -0.065* -0.083** -0.066*   
   (-2.13) (-1.85) (-2.32) (-1.90)    
ETA   0.012 0.011 0.010 0.008 
   (1.34) (1.26) (1.10) (0.87) 
LNTA   1.065*** 0.944*** 1.051*** 0.925*** 
   (4.75) (4.33) (4.75) (4.29) 
PE   -0.041 -0.009 -0.027 -0.023 
   (-1.08) (-0.24) (-0.72) (-0.59)    
ROAA   -0.070** -0.060** -0.052* -0.050*   
   (-2.51) (-2.13) (-1.83) (-1.77)    
LNDEP   -0.112 -0.060 -0.116 -0.122 
   (-0.50) (-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.57)    
GDP     -0.015*** -0.025*** 
     (-3.31) (-2.80)    
INF     -0.001 -0.040**  
     (-0.12) (-2.19)    
INT     0.032 -0.003 
     (1.65) (-0.11)    
Constant   -3.800*** -2.699** -3.578*** -0.92 
   (-5.82) (-2.52) (-4.80) (-0.77)    
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Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.698 0.730 0.709 0.739 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Third, to further control for path dependence in the series of the loan loss provision, 
remove the strict exogeneity assumption for independent variables, and eliminate the 
unobserved bank-specific effects, I employ the GMM estimator for hypothesis testing. 
Table (15) presents the dynamic panel regression results of corporate governance and 
alternative risk taking, LLP. All specifications can pass, at the 5% significance level, 
the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors and the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The evidence in Table (15) suggests that 
the strong corporate governance is still associated with higher bank risk taking. 
 
Table 15: The relationship between the interaction term and risk taking (Loan loss 
provision) - GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   DIFF SYS DIFF SYS 
Dependent 
variable 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP 
Lag.LLP   0.270*** 0.622*** 0.354*** 0.862*** 
   (4.34) (13.23) (4.95) (11.13) 
CG   -0.138*** -0.016* -0.060** -0.096**  
   (-7.70) (-1.81) (-2.21) (-2.39)    
ETA   -0.032** 0.009*** -0.021 -0.009**  
   (-2.16) (2.96) (-1.31) (-2.32)    
LNTA   2.201*** 0.042 1.796*** -0.059 
   (7.10) (0.86) (3.53) (-1.58)    
PE   -0.128*** -0.094 0.0845** 0.026 
   (-2.80) (-1.54) (2.58) (0.56) 
ROAA   -0.062** -0.082** -0.026 0.001 
   (-2.57) (-2.51) (-0.54) (0.02) 
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LNDEP   -1.375*** 0.394*** -1.309** 0.147 
   (-5.40) (10.14) (-2.69) (1.47) 
GDP     -0.013*** 0.010**  
     (-3.33) (2.04) 
INF     -0.013* -0.018*   
     (-1.94) (-1.71)    
INT     0.022 0.010 
     (0.84) (0.59) 
Constant    -2.249***  0.673 
    (-9.64)  (0.76) 
       
Observation   279 321 279 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1   0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Ar2   0.051 0.235 0.224 0.375 
Hansen   0.603 0.718 1.000 1.000 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio 
of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Fourth, I turn to empirically assess the relationship between governance individual 
components and loan loss provision (LLP) in Table (16), while controlling for the effect 
bank characteristics and other macroeconomic factors. Consistent with above, I find 
that my results continue to be qualitatively similar to those reported in previous. Thus, 
my conclusion on the relation between risk taking and governance is not sensitive to an 
alternative measure of risk. 
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Table 16: The relationship between the composition of corporate governance and risk taking (Loan loss provision) - OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 
varivariable 
 LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP 
           
1INDIV   -0.247***       -0.260*** 
   (-2.82)       (-2.94)    
2BS    0.005      -0.006 
    (0.13)      (-0.15)    
3DUAL     -0.217**     -0.238**  
     (-1.99)     (-2.16)    
4TOP10      -0.123    -0.107 
      (-1.22)    (-0.96)    
5 MH       0.078   0.092 
       (0.66)   (0.71) 
6FORE        0.033  -0.033 
        (0.53)  (-0.49)    
7AUDIT         -0.077 -0.039 
         (-0.94) (-0.46)    
ETA   0.0192*** 0.0180*** 0.0188*** 0.0171*** 0.0183*** 0.0178*** 0.0172*** 0.0198*** 
   (2.99) (2.76) (2.87) (2.63) (2.78) (2.73) (2.62) (2.98) 
LNTA   0.363*** 0.362*** 0.369*** 0.397*** 0.385*** 0.377*** 0.368*** 0.414*** 
   (3.13) (3.08) (3.13) (3.29) (3.17) (3.14) (3.11) (3.36) 
PE   -0.028 -0.021 -0.027 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.023 -0.032 
   (-0.77) (-0.57) (-0.72) (-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.56) (-0.62) (-0.85)    
ROAA   -0.062** -0.054* -0.053* -0.051* -0.054* -0.054* -0.055* -0.058**  
   (-2.16) (-1.89) (-1.86) (-1.77) (-1.89) (-1.90) (-1.92) (-2.03)    
LNDEP   0.620*** 0.611*** 0.610*** 0.591*** 0.592*** 0.598*** 0.612*** 0.596*** 
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   (5.15) (5.01) (4.98) (4.82) (4.76) (4.83) (4.98) (4.77) 
GDP   -0.016* -0.016* -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* -0.014 
   (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-1.80) (-1.83) (-1.81) (-1.93) (-1.61)    
INF   -0.022 -0.02 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.016 
   (-1.20) (-1.51) (-1.30) (-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.54) (-0.90)    
INT   -0.039 -0.027 -0.017 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.025 -0.028 
   (-1.18) (-0.84) (-0.52) (-0.90) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.76) (-0.85)    
Constant   -4.238*** -4.145*** -4.085*** -4.338*** -4.242*** -4.195*** -4.186*** -4.454*** 
   (-7.32) (-6.99) (-6.94) (-7.21) (-6.80) (-6.93) (-7.04) (-6.94)    
           
Year effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.727 0.722 0.726 0.721 0.722 0.722 0.723 0.732 
           
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculate as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of 
equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending 
interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if board controlled by more than 50% independent directors and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13 and o otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same person and 
0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor ownership is greater 
than zero and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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7 Conclusions 
Banking crises are crucial not just because of the destruction on a particular sector, but 
also typically the shock waves strike the entire economy. Thus, the substantial portions 
of banks’ wealth should be operated in a safe and sound manner. However, the relative 
opacity of banks provides some justification for regulator and investor suspicion. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the top management team and ownership structure, and 
its corporate governance systems in determining appropriate risk-taking is a critical 
issue in a modern commercial bank.  
 
This chapter examines the relationship between bank corporate governance and risk 
taking, using 43 Asian banks with the latest and a wider range of panel data that cover 
372 bank observations over the period from 2006 to 2014. The empirical results indicate 
that the effect of strong corporate governance on bank risk is significantly negative, 
which suggest that corporate governance that favors the interests of their shareholders, 
is associated with higher levels of bank risk taking. Despite with OLS and fixed effect 
estimations, my chapter also applies recent two-step system GMM dynamic panel data 
techniques as the robustness test. 
 
While my sample is unique in terms of the prudential regulation and similar cultural 
background, so the financial incentives analyze may also play a role in explaining risk 
in other businesses and stock markets. Other businesses are likely to face many of the 
same governance issues, such as board composition, designing appropriate incentive to 
top managers and ownership structure. All of these issues are need to take account when 
establish the appropriate governance structure of other banks and businesses. In 
addition, given the differences in institutions and business environment, it is certainly 
possible that the governance provisions may work differently in nonfinancial firms. 
Further exploration of nonfinancial firms’ specific governance attributes and criteria 
may be useful. 
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In response to the financial crisis, global authorities were tightened to strengthen 
corporate governance and resilience of the banking industry. Thus, improved 
understanding of bank risk is essential for a range of financial market participants. My 
findings highlight several important issues for policymakers in relevant economic 
authorities. First, to prevent excessive risk taking, regulators should adopt a more 
cautious approach to evaluate and approve bank engaged activities at the national level. 
If banking regulators are committed to safeguarding banks’ asset quality, elimination of 
explicit protection might be a sufficient condition. Second, to promote the stability of 
economy, regulators should encourage banks building a high standard of risk 
management system. Third, regulator should consider using a recent innovation in 
financial markets to reduce risk taking of banks’ executive (Bolton et al., 2015). The 
push for increased market discipline of banks may shed light on limiting risk taking. 
Indeed, market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating 
moral hazard problem (Keys et al., 2009).  
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